‘Trilateral grouping could take regional security to a new level’
NO COUNTRY has a more immediate sense of China’s aggressive impulses than does the Philippines.
Filipino fishermen are regularly harassed by Chinese maritime militia and navy, often denied access to traditional fishing grounds; its navy has engaged in literal tug of wars over missile debris found in its waters; Manila has been deceived in diplomatic negotiations over disputed territory; and it has won arbitral court rulings that were ignored or dismissed by the Beijing government. Manila’s protests go unheeded as Chinese forces carve away at Philippine territory.
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| A Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer and two U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers transit the Philippine Sea in April 2017. (U.S. Navy / via Reuters) |
That history should make the Philippines the poster child for cooperative efforts to bolster Southeast Asian security and stability. To put it another way, if concerned nations can’t rally behind Manila, then there is little chance of success elsewhere in the region. While the odds remain long — regional governments remain ready to avert their eyes to China’s misbehavior — conversations in Manila recently provide some reasons for optimism.
The U.S.-Philippines alliance, with its Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), is the cornerstone of the country’s security. That relationship has been tested in recent years. Driven by personal animus and a supposed strategic reassessment, former President Rodrigo Duterte sought to rebalance Manila’s foreign policy, putting more distance between his country and the U.S. — he repeatedly threatened to end the alliance — and move closer to China.
His successor, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., elected earlier this year, has reversed course. In recent months, Marcos met U.S. President Joe Biden, talked with Vice President Kamala Harris during a visit to the Philippines in November and capped a spate of sessions with senior U.S. foreign policy and defense officials.
The revitalization of the partnership goes beyond diplomatic meetings. The two militaries are expected to hold as many as 500 joint military activities next year, more than the U.S. plans to conduct with any other regional partner. Manila is reported to be ready to expand U.S access to key bases in the Philippines, doubling the current number to 10, including those that are well positioned in the event of a Taiwan crisis.
During her visit, Harris reiterated assurances that the South China Sea is covered by the MDT, noting that “An armed attack on the Philippines Armed Forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments.” This, she said, is “an unwavering commitment that we have to the Philippines.”
The vice president also announced that the U.S. would provide more than $80 million to develop basic infrastructure at those bases to support the newly invigorated partnership. All this has led Jose Manuel Romualdez, Philippine ambassador to the U.S., to say that “Our relationship with the U.S. is at its best right now.”
This is good, but it’s not enough. Also helpful are security relationships that Manila is developing with other partners, Japan among them. Japan has commenced meetings of ministers of foreign affairs and defense (so-called “two-plus-two” meetings) with Manila; since the inaugural session this spring, the two governments have agreed to pursue a Reciprocal Access Agreement (an essential administrative prerequisite to greater cooperation between the two militaries).
Officials also said that they were considering an agreement that would allow them to share equipment, another critical step forward in the defense partnership. When Marcos met Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the United Nations General Assembly in September, the two men agreed to further strengthen security cooperation (and that in other areas).
One important component has been the provision of military equipment by Japan to the Philippines. Between 2016 and 2018, Japan funded the Philippines’ acquisition of 10 Japanese-made, 44-meter patrol vessels for its coast guard; two 94-meter ships have been deployed this year. Last year Japan provided the Philippine military with lifesaving equipment adopted by the Self-Defense Forces, the first time that Tokyo has done so through official development assistance. And in November, Tokyo was scheduled to deliver an air surveillance radar unit, the first shipment since Japan relaxed export rules in 2014.
U.S. and Japanese contributions have strengthened Philippine military and law enforcement capabilities. But the transformation of the country’s security requires more than discrete efforts by partners. Genuine multilateral cooperation is the key to a qualitative shift — and the Japan-U.S.-Philippine triangle is the best way to move that process forward.
The alliance relationship with the U.S. is the foundation upon which the three countries can engage and build out. The three governments share geopolitical views and deem Chinese revisionism to be a genuine threat. They have established “habits of cooperation” through consultations on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and are working on deeper collaboration through the trilateral defense policy dialogue that was inaugurated in September. It identified areas of cooperation such as maritime security and maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity, information sharing and HADR.
Obstacles to a truly enhanced and capable trilateral security partnership are formidable. Some are obvious: legal restraints on the use of Japan’s military for anything other than its national defense; the Philippines’ lack of capacity; geography and resulting differences in priority attached to incursions against each country (more simply, Tokyo worries more about Chinese actions in the East China Sea, while Manila’s focus is the South China Sea); fear that providing support to one partner could create vulnerabilities elsewhere in the region; and concern that leaning too far forward on security could imperil economic relations with China.
There is a more subtle obstacle, one that is created by China’s preferred tactic — the use of “gray-zone” challenges that threaten a country’s interests but stay below the threshold of a kinetic conflict. China’s extensive island building in the South China Sea is a gray-zone tactic, as are regular incursions of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.
In each case, the Beijing government is slowly changing the regional status quo, extending its authority and territory to the detriment of other countries. Aggrieved governments are hard pressed to respond in ways that do not threaten escalation.
One option is to respond in kind. That doesn’t mean freedom of navigation operations. They are reactive and merely reassert that waterways remain international and are not subject to Chinese domestic law. For all the attention, FONOPS don’t change the most basic fact: Regional governments have ceded the initiative to Beijing, allowing it to dictate the focus and pace of events. It may be a slower, more measured process, but China is still taking the salami, slice by slice.
Instead, this logic argues that regional governments respond in kind, finding similar interests of China’s and equally subtly carving away at them. This makes sense but assumes that Beijing will be as risk averse when it comes to escalation as its targets have been.
One way to go on the offensive is launching an aggressive campaign to rewrite the narrative surrounding Chinese behavior in the region. Concerned governments should expose the gap between China’s rhetoric of “good neighborliness” and the reality of its actions, which shift the status quo in its favor. They should include industry and nongovernment organizations that have felt Beijing’s lash to help make the case and change regional perceptions of China.
Manila is the poster child for this effort. It won the 2016 arbitral court decision, which found that Chinese actions violated international law. There is no fear of a domestic backlash against China within the Philippines, unlike other Southeast Asian nations. Yet, incredibly, the Manila government did not play up its victory. Its reluctance to make its case gave other governments license to do the same.
This assumes that China cares about any reputational damage that might be done. Beijing may bet that such harm will only be short term, a price well worth paying for the extension of its power and influence.
It’s a bet worth taking. This trilateral has, among the many Southeast Asian options, the best chance of succeeding. It has the firmest foundations. The three governments are directly impacted by Chinese behavior and the countries have worked together to protect their interests. They appear ready to take their cooperation to the next level. Success could provide a template for other nations to do so as well. (Brad Glosserman, The Japan Times)
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