Surrendered militants to get gov’t aid

MARAWI CITY – The Philippine Army said the government is ready to provide aid to pro-ISIS militants who surrendered peacefully and returned to the fold of the law.

Over a hundred militants had surrendered to the government since last year after security forces defeated them in Marawi in 2017 following a deadly siege that left the city in ruins and displaced residents.

 

Abu Saif, a former pro-ISIS militant who surrendered to the military, is among those who will receive aid from the government. (Gian Raman) 

The surrendered militants have undergone a process aimed at identifying what government programs are necessary for them to live a normal life with their family.

The 103rd Infantry Brigade is tasked to run the process and provide inputs to the government which shall decide what programs and aid would be given to those who surrendered. Most of these programs are financial aid and livelihood skills training, among others. (Mindanao Examiner)


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100,000 Maranaos still have no homes 2 years after Marawi siege

MARAWI CITY - The deep scars left by the 2017 conflict in Marawi City in Lanao del Sur province in southern Philippines continue to haunt over 100,000 people who still do not have a home to return to.

 

“Despite the numerous aid efforts that have truly helped those in need over the two years, the people of Marawi have grown tired and frustrated. They want to stand on their own feet again and stop depending on assistance,” said Martin Thalmann, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation in the Philippines.

 

Whether they have been living with relatives or are in evacuation centres and transition sites, the displaced people of Marawi struggle for access to potable water, viable livelihood opportunities and most importantly, permanent shelters, according to Thalmann, who noted that the authorities were trying to address complex issues so that the rehabilitation of the most affected area (MAA) could begin.

 

But the conflict has left more vulnerable groups, such as families of missing people and victims of violence, with invisible scars. “The wounds that do not bleed are the wounds that become scars. And these are the most painful because they will always leave something to look at. And it is something that will always bring back memories of what had happened. Nevertheless, it is still important because it is still a lesson,” recalled Mel, a 34-year-old resident who was severely traumatized by the Marawi conflict.

 

Launched in October 2018, the ICRC’s mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) programme has reached close to 700 people. Among them, 47 people who were severely traumatized in the Marawi conflict—including “Mel”—have reported feeling “relieved, comfortable, safe and understood” after undergoing individual MHPSS sessions.

 

“They need sustained support to recover mentally from the trauma caused by the conflict that has affected their overall well-being,” Thalmann said.

 

He said ICRC would work on strengthening the capacity of the public health system in the area of psychosocial support to victims of violence. He said the ICRC, with its partner the Philippine Red Cross, has been supporting people affected since the onset of the Marawi conflict.

 

People who were injured during the fighting received ICRC support to cover the cost of their medical treatment. Those with physical disabilities as result of injuries were supported by ICRC to receive prosthesis and physiotherapy, Thalmann said.

 

The ICRC, he said, continues to help the displaced people by restoring sources of income and improving access to water and sanitation in various sites. It has also been working with families whose loved ones went missing due to the conflict.

 

“We have been filling the gaps in the recovery response in coordination with the authorities and other aid organizations. But we can only do so much. The authorities still have the primary responsibility of providing sustainable solutions to help the people of Marawi,” Thalmann said. (With a report from the Mindanao Examiner.)

 

 

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DOST launches project to preserve weaving skills of Maranaos

ILIGAN CITY – In an effort to revive the handloom weaving among Maranaos, the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has provided technical and financial assistance to Maranaos displaced by the 2017 siege of Marawi City in Lanao del Sur province.

The project – a collaborative efforts by DOST, the Mindanao State University Iligan Institute of Technology's Maranao Collectible and the local government - aims to preserve and strengthen the weaving industry as it represents culture and tradition of Mindanaons especially the Maranaos.

Keno Elumbaring, Project Assistant for DOST-Task Force Bangon Marawi Programs, said the project supports the rebuilding of Maranaos' livelihood. He said the beneficiaries include the home-based internally-displaced people who are currently staying within Iligan City, Cagayan De Oro and other areas of Lanao del Norte.

The target beneficiaries will undergo skills training on weaving and hands-on activities. A loom weaving equipment will be provided to the beneficiaries including the installation of loom weaving machines in the identified sites. "This is part of DOST's support to rebuilding and reorganizing the loom weavers affected by the conflict in Marawi City," Elumbaring said.

He said DOST will also help in the production and promotion of local hand-woven crafts. "DOST will monitor and assess the beneficiaries if they are able to improve and enhance their skills in handloom weaving," Elumbaring said.

The project implementation includes the setting-up of weaving center within selected areas in Marawi City and its neighboring communities, which were also affected by the siege. The DOST is a member agency of the Task Force Marawi's Subcommittee on Business and Livelihood. It targets to preserve the cultural and artistic value of the weaving industry among Marawi residents. (Lade Jean Kabagani)


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ARMM holds 1st Bangsamoro Datathon

COTABATO CITY - The Regional Planning and Development Office (RPDO-ARMM) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) spearheaded a three-day Bangsamoro Datathon here.
The Bangsamoro Datathon (data + marathon) is a series of support processes in service of the transition from the ARMM to Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The exercise covered open data, open street mapping, and benchmark data.

The project is aimed consolidating and evaluating available administrative, statistical, and framework geospatial data of the ARMM and existing development plans and studies; comprehensive data inventory and consolidation required to build a baseline for the shift from the ARMM to the Bangsamoro Transition Authority this year; focus on development data, not human resource data (assets, liabilities, and personnel); train analysts and other officers of the ARMM regional government and the incoming Bangsamoro Transition Authority on basic geospatial analysis; and encourage the practice of open data in the context of open governance in the Bangsamoro.

The initial dataset was for Marawi City and Lanao del Sur for the first quarter of 2018. Later, the ARMM Regional Government worked with its different line agencies to also try updating the Regional Physical Framework Plan and the five Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plans in preparation for the transition to the incoming new Bangsamoro government.

During the recent activity, an overview and inventory of all the data, place-based analysis, and geographical data generation and cleaning were conducted. “This project marks the Bangsamoro as the first region in the Philippines to have an open geospatial and statistical portal for development planning and programming,” Baintan Adil-Ampatuan, RPDO-ARMM executive director, said.

The datathon was successfully conducted with the support of all ARMM line agencies, provincial governments of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, National Economic and Development Authority, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, and the technical working staff of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission.

It was financed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and The Asia Foundation. (Bureau of Public Information)

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3 militants yield in Lanao del Sur

PAGADIAN CITY – Three pro-ISIS fighters have surrendered to the military in southern Philippines where security forces are battling several militant groups seeking to put up a strict caliphate in the troubled region.

Capt. Clint Antipala, a spokesman for the 1^st Infantry Division, said the trio – who fought troops during the Marawi City siege in 2017 – also yielded one anti-tank rocket launcher, a grenade launcher and one M1 rifle and ammunition when they surrendered January 12 to the 82^nd Infantry Battalion in Lanao del Sur’s Piagapo town.

Two of their companions earlier surrendered to the 55^th Infantry Battalion in Pagayawan town.
“Dissatisfied and discontented with the leadership and capabilities of the group is the reason why they’ve surrendered,” Antipala said, quoting Lt. Col. Jumawan, 82^nd Infantry Battalion commander.

Maj. Gen. Roseller Murillo, the division commander, praised soldiers for their efforts in convincing militants to surrender. “Our campaign against terrorists will be relentless and we will take advantage of their weakened leadership and capabilities in order to attain a just and lasting peace in our area of operation,” he said, according to Antipala.

Antipala also released photos of the trio, but all their faces were blurred and cannot be used for news. Their names were not made public. (Mindanao Examiner)


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9 ARMM towns under ‘areas of grave concern’ for 2019 polls

COTABATO CITY - Police authorities in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao have listed 9 towns in the region where violence are likely to happen in the upcoming 2019 elections.

 

Chief Supt. Graciano Mijares, ARMM police director, identified the towns as Hadji Mohammad Ajul,  Lantawan and Tipo-Tipo towns all in Basilan province; Marawi City and Sultan Dumalondong in Lanao del Sur province; and Mamasapano, Shariff Aguak, Shariff Saydona Mustapha, and Datu Unsay, all in Maguindanao.

 

Mijares said they have recommended those towns to be placed under “hot spot” areas in the coming elections and listed them as “election areas of grave concern.” “The presence of armed men and private armed groups in the following areas had a history of election-related violence,” Mijares said.

 

The number of areas under such category might increase, he said, depending on the result of the weekly assessment conducted by both the police and the military. (PNA)

 

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2 soldiers gunned down in Cotabato City

COTABATO CITY – Two army soldiers were gunned down Friday morning in Cotabato City in southern Philippines despite an extended martial law in the troubled region.

The duo – both in civilian clothes - was travelling on a motorcycle when gunmen ambushed them along Sinsuat Avenue at around 9 in the morning.

The soldiers were instantly killed in the attack. The 6^th Infantry Division did not release any report on the twin murders, but gun attacks here are not uncommon.

Photos of the slain soldiers were circulated on Facebook and have identified them as Private First Class Nerwin Delfin and Michael Haudar, who were members of the 37^th Infantry Battalion. Their unit is deployed in Maguindanao province. Witnesses said motorcycle gunmen attacked the duo without warning.

It was unknown if the killings were perpetrated by rebels or pro-ISIS militants fighting for a separate state in Mindanao where President Rodrigo Duterte imposed martial law since last year following a deadly siege by militants in Marawi City.

The murders occurred ahead of the referendum next month of the controversial Bangsamoro Organic Law which. If ratified, it would replace the current Muslim autonomous region and would be ruled by the rebel group Moro Islamic Liberation Front which signed an interim peace deal with Manila in 2014. (Mindanao Examiner)

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Misinformation and intelligence failures: How the Philippines underestimates ISIS - The Defense Post

DESPITE THE PRESENCE of multiple militant groups in the Philippines who have made pledges of allegiance, or bayah, to Islamic State, the Philippine’ government and Armed Forces (AFP) have downplayed this threat.

The statements they’ve made continuously ignore the reality of ISIS in the Philippines. This is partially due to the AFP deliberately downplaying the threat from ISIS by making false statements, something they’ve admitted to. At the same time, the Philippine government and the AFP have also managed to genuinely underestimate ISIS, likely in part due to the public downplaying of the threat as well as systematic intelligence failures.

Underestimating ISIS gave it the opportunity to stage major attacks that should have been preventable. The Philippines has seen decades of conflict in the southern region of Mindanao, where the majority of the country’s Muslim minority live. Successive militant groups have fought the AFP in an attempt to form an independent state, and two major separatist militant groups have signed peace treaties with the government, agreeing to end fighting in return for various levels of autonomy.

However, splinter factions and other more recently founded organizations have led to a patchwork of extremist groups that continue to fight. Some of the most notable of these groups are the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, various Abu Sayyef Group battalions, and the Maute group.

 

Philippine groups pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi

 

In 2014 some Philippine groups began to give bayah to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, including senior Abu Sayyef commander Isnilon Hapilon, and BIFF. In the following years, more groups pledged allegiance to ISIS, including the Maute group.

 

ISIS later discussed the Philippines through various parts of their media apparatus. In 2014, the fifth edition of the group’s Dabiq magazine stated that groups in the Philippines had pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, and “announced the acceptance of the bay’āt from all of these groups and individuals.” Both the group’s spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani and Baghdadi himself made appeals to Filipinos to resist the “crusaders” and “rise against the apostate.”

 

In February and March 2016 ISIS’s official Al Furat Media released videos of Hapilon and commanders from several other groups pledging allegiance to Baghdadi. It should have been clear that these groups were now part of ISIS. The Philippine government and AFP responded by stating that ISIS did not exist in the Philippines, with the then president Benigno Aquino saying, “It’s difficult to call them Islamic State groups.”

 

Philippine officials would for years treat Abu Sayyef, Maute, BIFF and other militant groups as if nothing had changed, seemingly failing to understand that they were now part of ISIS because they had pledged allegiance and it had been recognized. In an effort to justify this position, officials made the distinction that, while the various militant groups in the southern Philippines may be ISIS-inspired, they were not ISIS-directed.

 

They argued that while some individuals within Philippine groups, or even entire groups may be inspired by the extremist ideas of ISIS, they were not directed by ISIS in any way, implying there was no communication with ISIS and that groups did not receive orders from them. This argument was flawed, as it ignored known communications between ISIS in the Philippines and its core in Iraq and Syria. Videos and statements about groups in the Philippines were released by official ISIS outlets, suggesting a line of communication.

 

Filipinos had been known to travel to fight for ISIS in Iraq and Syria, often facilitated by communication with ISIS members. Communication with ISIS by militant groups in the Philippines is believed to have occurred as early as 2014, while certain militants, often Malaysians, enabled lines of communication between Philippine groups and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Connections would deepen over time, with ISIS encouraging fighters to travel to the Philippines, giving direct orders to Filipino commanders, and even sending funds to support the activities of groups that had pledged allegiance to ISIS.

 

Deepening connections

 

Even if this inspired-versus-directed distinction wasn’t false, it risked a dangerous complacency. The fact that these groups had all pledged allegiance to ISIS made them potentially more dangerous than before. It risked greater cooperation amongst historically fragmented groups with their support of ISIS overpowering geographic, clan, and ethnic divisions.

 

There was also the risk of groups emulating the more extreme tactics of ISIS. Finally, in an attempt to win approval and recognition from ISIS, militant groups may have attempted to stage more significant attacks. All of these things would later happen in the Philippines. As deepening connections became more apparent, the Philippine government and the AFP continued to deny the presence of ISIS. In 2015, a video surfaced online showing what was described as a Philippines ISIS training camp.

 

In response, the Philippine National Security Adviser said, “ISIS has no training camps in the Philippines.”

This ignored evidence in the video itself, and in other videos and pictures showing militants training in the Philippines which were often uploaded to social media. In the minds of government officials, these were not ISIS camps because they did not view the militants operating them as part of ISIS. While the government denied the presence of ISIS, the camps were used to train new militants, people preparing to stage terror attacks, and even foreigners who had traveled to the Philippines for training before returning to their home countries.

 

The 2016 Basilan attack

 

In April 2016, a particularly bloody clash between militants and the AFP on the island of Basilan in the southern Philippines led to more denials about the role of ISIS. While attempting to target Hapilon and another commander, Furiji Indama, soldiers were ambushed, which led to a 10-hour gunfight that left 18 soldiers dead and more than 50 wounded, the worst losses in a single day for Philippine security forces that year. ISIS claimed the incident through their Amaq news agency shortly afterwards, and a May 2016 edition of Al Naba reported on clashes in the Philippines over the previous few weeks, including the one in Basilan. Finally, an infographic released that June by Amaq talked about soldiers killed by ISIS forces, including those in the ambush.

 

In response, the AFP denied ISIS had any role, saying that it was mere propaganda and that Abu Sayyef was responsible, again, seemingly ignoring that the group was by then part of ISIS. The fighting had been led by Hapilon himself, who that month ISIS publicly named as emir of all their forces in the Philippines. In addition, one of the slain militants was a Moroccan named Mohammad Khattab, who was reportedly building links between Abu Sayyef and ISIS.

 

Further indications of the connections between ISIS and groups in the Philippines came two months later when a video released by ISIS showed a Filipino, a Malaysian, and an Indonesian beheading three men in Syria. In the video they again recognized Hapilon as emir and called on jihadist groups in the Philippines to unify under him. They also urged people who could not travel to Syria to travel to the Philippines to fight for ISIS. In response, military spokesperson Brigadier-General Restituto Padilla described the video as “propaganda.” “People should not be bothered by this,” Padilla added.

 

The Battle of Marawi begins

 

Terrorist incidents continued through late 2016 and early 2017, the most notable being the September 2016 Davao city bombing and the brief takeover of the town of Butig two months later by the Maute group. These bolder attacks, sometimes involving multiple groups, in hindsight predicted what was to come.

 

On May 23, 2017, the AFP launched a raid to arrest Hapilon, who had been spotted in the city of Marawi, on Mindanao. Security forces stumbled into a city full of militants, triggering long-made plans by ISIS to seize the city. The botched raid by Filipino security forces had kicked off the Battle of Marawi.

 

An AFP statement released a day after the start of fighting said: “The situation in Marawi has stabilized,” and that “security forces are in full control of the situation.” As the AFP denied the presences of ISIS, the group’s Amaq news agency released pictures from within Marawi showing ISIS fighters in broad daylight standing on streets, raising flags, and manning checkpoints unmolested by Philippine security forces.

 

The military claimed that there were only “sporadic clashes” from “harassment actions by terrorist sympathizers.” Most erroneously it was claimed that the militants in Marawi were “not members of the ISIS, but members of a local terrorist group.” Two days later Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana said in a statement that the fighting would be over in a week at most, while AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Año said there were fewer than 100 militants in the city. Throughout the battle similar false claims about the number of ISIS militants and how long until the city would be captured were repeated.

 

There were even several instances when the military claimed the recapture of locations within the city despite them remaining firmly under ISIS control. It would be five months of hard fighting before Marawi was recaptured, defying claims made by the government and security forces throughout. The battle saw the deaths of Hapilon and the leaders of the Maute group along with over 900 of their men, according to the government. But victory came at a price. The city was left in ruins, 165 AFP soldiers were killed, more than 1,000 wounded, and ISIS achieved a significant propaganda victory.

 

Philippine military ordered to downplay ISIS threat

 

Due to the Battle of Marawi, President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law across all of Mindanao. Documents submitted to the Supreme Court of the Philippines justifying the declaration revealed one reason why the AFP continuously made these false claims about ISIS. It had been deliberate. In a memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court on June 19, 2017, Año was quoted as saying the threat of ISIS was deliberately downplayed, and that “despite the actual threat of ISIS in the Philippines,” the AFP had been ordered to “downplay any news or information” relating to ISIS.

 

The memo also said statements made about ISIS by the AFP were “propaganda.” The justification for this was to not “give them recognition and fan the flames of rebellion” as well as to “encourage foreign investments and maintain confidence in the Philippine economy.” Deliberately misleading the public about the threat from ISIS is a concerning prospect on its own, but worse, it doesn’t work as a full justification. Statements made by police and other officials appeared to show that the government also underestimated ISIS.

 

It is unknown if similar orders to those given to the AFP were given to police and other members of the government, but these statements also spanned two administrations as well as many departments. That the government was not fully aware of the threat from ISIS is evident in private statements by Philippine officials that repeatedly ignored intelligence warnings; the AFP so often being wrong-footed against them; and multiple officials admitting to underestimating ISIS.

 

Duterte himself said officials were aware of the build-up of militants before the Battle of Marawi but “underestimated” the threat. Major-General Carlito Galvez, head of the West Mindanao Command, said: “We knew this was coming,” and he has reportedly implied that Manila downplayed the threat. Lorenzana, the defense secretary, said the government was “in denial” over the involvement of foreign ISIS fighters and that the army was unprepared.

 

While factors such as poor intelligence led the Philippine government and AFP to underestimate ISIS, publicly downplaying the threat likely reinforced this. Downplaying the threat was part of AFP’s psychological operations with the stated intentions to “mislead” and “influence the perceptions” of a group. These psychological operations were not targeted in any way, being made publicly and widely repeated by the media, often at face value. This could have had the effect of making it harder for lower-level officials and members of the security services to take the threat seriously, while the inaccurate statements downplaying ISIS could also reinforce the poor intelligence members of the government and security officials received suggesting the group wasn’t as serious a threat as in reality.

 

Poor intelligence gathering and assessment

 

The poor gathering and assessment of intelligence was a key reason for the Philippines underestimating ISIS. Indonesia’s Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu recently described an exchange he had when he traveled to the Philippines on June 6, 2017, shortly after the start of the Battle of Marawi. He said he was told by unnamed Philippine officials that there were only 50 militants in Marawi, supported by up to 500 men from drug cartel networks.

 

After the battle, Philippine officials said more than 900 militants had been killed, highlighting that they were clearly underestimating the strength of ISIS both in public and in private. Not only did Philippine officials not have the intelligence information to more accurately assess the strength of militants in Marawi, but they completely misjudged their nature. They were not men from “drug cartel networks” but loyal ISIS militants, willing to fight to the death for their cause.

 

Shortly before this meeting, Ryacudu said that Indonesia estimated there were 1,000 to 1,200 ISIS militants in the Philippines. Considering that over 900 fighters were apparently killed in Marawi, and that multiple other groups were not active in the battle, this estimate seems broadly accurate. In response to that statement, Philippine Defense Undersecretary Ricardo David said the number was new to him. “I really don’t know, my figure is about 250-400, a lot less,” David said. Not only does this illustrate the apparent inability of the government to accurately assess the threat from ISIS, but it showcases that even foreign countries had managed to achieve a more accurate assessment.

 

Intelligence failures

 

Speaking more generally, Ryacudu also expressed disappointment in Philippine intelligence-gathering and sharing as well as country’s assessment of the threat from ISIS. He said he believed that that “governments underestimated the extent of the IS threat in our region.” Even more damningly, Ryacudu said that with better use of intelligence the Battle of Marawi “could have been prevented or pre-empted.”

 

In the aftermath of major terrorist incidents it would repeatedly be revealed that the Philippines had failed to act on intelligence that should have prevented or prepared them for attacks. There was a pattern of failing to assess intelligence, suggesting officials underestimated the actual danger. In fact, there had been repeated intelligence pointing towards an attack in Marawi in the month leading up to the battle.

 

The AFP’s Año has stated that intelligence had been received about armed men entering the city. He also said that commanders on the ground had failed to assess intelligence. Major General Rolando Bautista, commander of forces in Marawi, said the military had even received information saying that terrorists would seize the city.

 

It was only when following up on both this intelligence and reports that the leaders of the Maute group were in Marawi that they discovered Hapilon, the most important ISIS commander in the Philippines, was also there. Bautista immediately decided to capture him, ordering the failed raid that triggered the seizure of the city. While Marawi is the most prominent example of the Philippines underestimating ISIS and having issues with gathering and following up on intelligence, it is not the only one.

 

The April 2016 Basilan clash that killed 18 soldiers was a well-prepared ambush. Militants attacked from high ground and all sides using various weapons, including mortars and grenade launchers. The soldiers also had to contend with improvised explosive devices planted by militants. As well as inflicting high casualties, militants beheaded some of the dead soldiers and captured an unconfirmed quantity of weaponry. Concerns were raised in the aftermath about the handling of the operation and the AFP’s failure to address the ISIS threat. Two generals speaking anonymously called for a probe and suggested there were serious failings in how the operation was carried out. “What happened was a failure of leadership from top to bottom” as well as a “failure of intelligence,” one general said.

 

Officials should have addressed their failings on multiple occasions, but the Battle of Marawi should have been a clear wakeup call. Marawi did force the Philippine government and security forces to admit some of their failings, but there has been no attempt to rectify them. Both continue to downplay the threat from ISIS, and there are still apparent intelligence failings, with Ryacudu stating on October 4 that since Marawi the flow of intelligence has not been effective and has even become “less accurate.”

 

There is no ISIS-Philippines

 

In February the United States designated ISIS-Philippines as a terrorist organization. While the effect of such a designation was welcomed, as it criminalizes providing support and resources to the group and denies access to U.S. financial systems, the concept of an “ISIS-Philippines” was discounted by some Philippine officials.

 

“There is no ISIS-Philippines,” Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said in March. Duterte’s spokesperson Harry Roque did acknowledge the presence of ISIS but limited it to just the Maute group.

 

“That’s ISIS-Maute. I think it’s specific since Maute is known to be the local ISIS,” he said in a statement. The U.S. designation referred to the whole of the ISIS-affiliated organization in the Philippines. The description referenced the June 2016 ISIS video that featured Hapilon and several other Abu Sayyef militants belonging pledging allegiance to ISIS, and called Maute an “integral part of ISIS-Philippines.”

 

This July saw arguably the most significant attack by ISIS in the Philippines since Marawi, when a suicide car bomb was detonated at a military checkpoint on Basilan, killing 11 people. ISIS claimed the attack via their Amaq news agency. The claim stated that it was a suicide attack and named the perpetrator as Abu Khatir Al-Maghribi, a Moroccan.

 

A picture was also released showing the attacker. In response, AFP spokesperson Colonel Edgardo Arevalo said that there was no indication that ISIS was involved. He said intelligence pointed to Abu Sayyef, and that there was no indication the attacker was a foreigner. He also said there was “no indication that the Basilan blast was a suicide bombing.”

 

These denials came despite the photographic evidence released by ISIS as well as witnesses who said the driver was a foreigner, and the group responsible was also behind the 2016 Basilan clashes. Almost two weeks after the attack Lorenzana finally stated that it was believed the attacker was Moroccan, but he still downplayed the possibility of it being a suicide attack and denied that ISIS was involved.

 

There had also been reports that intelligence had warned about the bombing before it occurred. A government intelligence report reportedly stated that as early as June 19 officials were aware of a plan to carry out a bombing at any time in Lamitan, the area of Basilan where the attack took place.

 

The day before the bombing there were reports of Malaysian militants arriving on the island, who are now believed to be connected to the attack. Finally, the AFP had intelligence reports that a van containing explosives would pass by Lamitan City.

 

Like Marawi, despite receiving intelligence pointing towards an imminent attack, authorities had been unable to prevent it. It has also become common for ISIS groups in the Philippines to be discussed as “remnants” following the Battle of Marawi. This is despite it being over a year since the start of the battle, with the groups involved actively recruiting since. Other ISIS factions – such as BIFF – also had minimal involvement in the battle, meaning their operational strength was not significantly affected by the fighting. Meanwhile, ISIS has upgraded their East Asia region including the Philippines to an official Wilayat, or province, and increased propaganda releases about the Philippines.

 

The Philippine government and security forces knowingly released inaccurate statements about the threat from ISIS, downplaying the dangers in an attempt to not legitimize the group and to maintain foreign investment and faith in the Philippine economy.

 

The Battle of Marawi and the declaration of martial law that followed shattered both of those justifications. Yet this downplaying continues to be a tactic used by the Philippine government and the AFP despite its ineffectiveness and role in leading to the genuine underestimation of ISIS’s true strength.

 

The repeated intelligence failings that plagued operations against the group were and still are a key factor in that inaccurate assessment. Like many instances before it, the Battle of Marawi should have seen the Philippine government and security forces address their failings in the interest of preventing another such attack, yet they appear to continue to make those same mistakes. Those mistakes come at the expense of security personnel and civilians caught up in the next preventable ISIS attack. (By Robert Postings - The Defense Post)